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In 2007 Timor-Leste, a malaria endemic country, changed its Malaria Treatment Protocol for uncomplicated
falciparum malaria from sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine to artemether-lumefantrine. The change in treatment policy
was based on the rise in morbidity due to malaria and perception of increasing drug resistance. Despite a lack of
nationally available evidence on drug resistance, the Ministry of Health decided to change the protocol. The policy
process leading to this change was examined through a qualitative study on how the country developed its
revised treatment protocol for malaria. This process involved many actors and was led by the Timor-Leste Ministry
of Health and the WHO country office. This paper examines the challenges and opportunities identified during this
period of treatment protocol change.
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 The process of policy formulation in all settings,
including those which are resource-poor, requires
considerable attention to identifying, consulting and
actively engaging, the range of health system
participants that will have an influence on the policy
and its implementation.
 In the presence of limited government capacity,
expertise from development partners and the
non-government sector can add value if drawn into
the process and utilized to develop and formulate
new policies.
 Strong leadership, at times coupled with potentially
unpopular decisions, may be required to drive the
policy process and produce desired outcomes in
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Malaria is endemic in Timor-Leste. Since gaining inde-
pendence in 2002, the country has changed the Malaria
Treatment Protocol (MTP) three times, each associated
with a new edition of government malaria treatment guide-
lines. The first edition was published in 2002, and the sec-
ond and the third in 2005 and 2007, respectively [1-3].
When Timor-Leste was under Indonesian occupation
and administration (1975–1999), the first line treatment
for both falciparum and vivax malaria was chloroquine [4].
While chloroquine continued to be recommended in
all editions for treating vivax malaria, the treatment for
falciparum malaria has changed. The first and the second
MTP recommended sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) for
treating uncomplicated falciparum malaria [1,3] while the
most recent change recommended artemisinin-based com-
bination therapy (ACT) for this form of malaria
The World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines for
malaria treatment in 2006 recommended changing first-
line treatment when the total failure proportion of anti-
malarial drug exceeds 10% [5]. Countries in South East
Asia, such as Indonesia and Thailand which had used SP
as the first-line drug for falciparum malaria experienced
a rapid increase of parasites resistant to this drug [6].
Consequently, almost all countries in South East AsiaLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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Timor-Leste followed suit and created the third MTP edi-
tion which recommended artemether-lumefantrine (AL;
Coartem® - its trade name) as the first-line treatment for
uncomplicated falciparum malaria. The revised MTP also
included the use of a rapid diagnostic test (RDT) [2]. The
revised MTP has been used since 2008 to date [7]. At
the launch of the third edition of the MTP in June 2007,
the then Minister for Health, Dr Rui Maria de Araujo,
stated that the replacement of the existing treatment
protocol for malaria was based on the increased reported
cases of P. falciparum resistance to chloroquine and SP
and the increasing use of ACT for treating falciparum
malaria in South East Asia region [8].
Changing any government policy requires intense effort;
the challenges are not as great when the change is incre-
mental, as in this case, but even in these situations policy
change is often contested [9]. It is well accepted that pol-
icy change is influenced by the context within which it
operates, the actors involved, and the processes through
which change occurs [10]. A study of malaria treatment
change in two provinces in South Africa, Mpumalanga
and Limpopo, found that local data on drug efficacy,
official endorsement by the government, gate keeper
viewpoints, and political influences together provided
the evidence and rationale for the policy shift [11].
Williams et al. noted that rational policy formulation
requires: 1) collection of scientifically valid evidence;
2) presentation of evidence in such a way as to attract pol-
itical attention; 3) consensus-building about the need for a
change; 4) ensuring consistency between the new policy
with the national drug policy framework; 5) attention to
policy implementation; and finally, 6) monitoring and
evaluation to inform subsequent policy development [12].
The important point of changing treatment protocol is to
avoid the use of inappropriate and in-efficacious anti-
malarial drugs as this exacerbates drug resistance which
will result in direct and indirect cost to human life, the
health system and economic development [13].
The rationale for changing treatment policy due to emer-
ging drug resistance has been well documented [14-16].
However, little is known about the policy process involved
in altering a national treatment protocol, an issue explored
here. The paper focuses on the reasons for the change, the
actors involved, and the challenges encountered.Methods
The study examined the process of treatment policy change
using a combination of qualitative methods including open-
ended interviews with key informants and document re-
views. Data were collected between April and July 2008.
Ethical clearance was obtained from The University of
New South Wales Human Research Ethics Committee(HREC 07231) and national permission granted by the
Timor-Leste Ministry of Health (VM-MS/UNSW/07/121).
Twenty-four key informants who had contributed to the
development of the protocol were purposively selected.
These informants were drawn from the Malaria Working
Group, the National Commission for Protocol Finalization
(NCPF) and senior Ministry of Health (MoH) officials
(former Minister for Health, Vice-Minister, Permanent
Secretary, Director of Health Service Delivery, and Dir-
ector of Health Policy and Planning) who oversaw the
protocol formulation process. Eight of the informants
worked for the MoH, six for WHO in Timor-Leste, four
for NGOs, two from the Timor-Leste Medical Associ-
ation, and four were private clinicians. Fourteen interviews
with Timorese key informants were conducted in Tetum
(one of the official languages in Timor-Leste) by the two
Timorese researchers (JM and FB). Ten interviews with
International agencies were conducted in English by JM.
Among those interviewed, nearly two thirds had been ac-
tively involved in the formulation team and NCPF, while
the others were senior MoH and WHO officials who con-
tributed in other ways to the process.
Open-ended interview questions were designed to
elicit data concerning the timing of events, the rationale
for changing the protocol, the level of involvement of ac-
tors, and their views, experience and influence over the
process. Interviews with key informants were conducted
face-to-face and normally lasted from half to one hour.
All interviews in both Tetum and English were tran-
scribed; those conducted in Tetum were first translated
into English and then checked (AZ and JM). The first
author is a native Tetum speaker and consulted the ori-
ginal recording and text as required to clarify meaning.
Interview transcripts were imported into NVivo 7 soft-
ware for coding. Coding was based on the themes derived
from text as well as those related to aspects of context,
process and actor involvement. Other important themes
included the chronology of policy change, the rationale for
policy change and the challenges faced during the MTP
formulation process.
Documents analysed were relevant to the processes
involved in formulation of the MTP and included meeting
minutes, reports, circulars, and directive letters issued by
the MoH. Data analysis was guided by the grounded theory
approach [17,18] and Walt and Gilson’s (1994) policy tri-
angle [10]. Content analysis was also used. Insights from
the interviews were triangulated with those of other infor-
mants as well as with the document reviews and vice versa.
Results
Chronology of malaria treatment policy (MTP 3rd edition)
development
In 2005, the Malaria Working Group (MWG), formed
by the MoH to provide advice on the implementation of
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assess the progress of malaria programs funded by the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis
(Global Fund). Membership was drawn from the MoH,
UN agencies and NGOs. In the second half of 2005,
meetings held in September and December discussed
the possibility of introducing ACT in Timor-Leste. The
meetings resulted in two relevant recommendations:
“1. ACT should be introduced in Timor-Leste for
effective treatment of uncomplicated falciparum
malaria especially for high risk groups, pregnant
women and children under five;
2. Pilot implementation of ACT should be started in
two districts (tentatively, Lautem and Bobonaro) after
strengthening of laboratory services, development of
ACT using guidelines, training of district health staff
and certainty of long-term availability of ACT is
established” [19].
The MWG sought advice from the Minister for Health
regarding the process of modifying the MTP. Since a study
on drug efficacy was deemed not feasible (discussed fur-
ther below), the Minister gave instructions to change the
malaria treatment protocol on the basis of evidence from
outside Timor-Leste. The MWG commenced researching
and compiling relevant evidence. This was followed by
the drafting of the MTP by the MoH Department of
Communicable Disease Control (CDC) and WHO be-
tween February 2006 and May 2007.
In May 2007, the MoH established the NCPF with 16
members from the MWG, the Cuban Medical Brigade
(which for a number of years has provided support in
Timor-Leste), NGOs, health professional associations
and the private sector. The NCPF was chaired by a senior
medical doctor from a private clinic and the head of
the CDC Department, MoH. The role of the NCPF was
to provide technical inputs, finalise the revised MTP,
approve the final draft, and ensure socialisation (intro-
ductory training and dissemination) and implementa-
tion of the protocol. The NCPF held its first meeting
on the 3rd of May 2007 followed by a three-day work-
shop. An agreed final draft was available by the 16th of
May 2007.
The revised MTP was officially launched by the Minister
for Health on 12 June 2007. Translation into Tetum (to
ensure availability to local Timorese health care staff ) and
Spanish (to inform treatment by personnel associated with
the Cuban Medical Brigade) took place between July and
September 2007. The socialisation of the new MTP took
place between October and December 2007 [7].
In January 2008, the Permanent Secretary of the MoH
issued a directive letter to all 13 District Health Servicesand all hospitals in the country instructing them to
implement the revised MTP. A similar letter was issued
again in March 2008 to the country’s District Health
Offices to implement this MTP by the newly appointed
Director General who replaced the Permanent Secretary.
A study aiming at evaluating the implementation of this
new MTP has been published [7].The actors, context and process
Figure 1 illustrates the processes, timelines and the actors
involved in the MTP formulation process, using Anderson’s
model of the policy cycle [20].Actors
The main factors involved in the formulation of the MTP
included the MoH, WHO, MWG and NCPF. The MoH
assigned its own CDC Department, WHO and the MWG
to jointly initiate drafting the MTP. Within a few months
the draft was produced and shared with the NCPF.
Actors’ participation in the development of the MTP
included providing technical advice on protocol develop-
ment, providing clinical expertise and opinion, reviewing
and editing the content of the protocol, providing transla-
tion and disseminating the MTP (socialisation) (Table 1).Context
The existing collaboration between the MoH and the NGOs
involved in the Global Fund provided an enabling envir-
onment for revising the MTP [21]. Through the MWG,
the actors were already familiar with each other and this
facilitated cooperation and collaboration on both program-
matic and policy issues.
The absence of a human research ethics committee,
lack of funding and national experts in malaria research
influenced the MoH’s decision to consider it unfeasible
to undertake a drug efficacy study but instead to change
the MTP based on available international evidence.
The external context was characterised by rising evi-
dence of SP resistance in neighbouring countries (particu-
larly Thailand and Indonesia) [15,16,22]. Another stimulus
for changing the protocol was the political decision at
the Ministerial Meeting in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 2006 to
adopt ACT as the standard treatment for the P. falciparum
infections in South-East Asia Region [23,24].
However, there were also inhibiting factors which af-
fected the protocol formulation process. A major part of
the protocol development took place in 2006 and 2007
at a time of major political instability in the country,
particularly in the capital, Dili [25,26]. This insecurity
affected participation in this process and caused a longer
than anticipated MTP formulation process.
TIMELINES
MWG= Malaria Working Group;MoH= Ministry of Health; WHO= World Health Organization; NCPF= National
Commission for Protocol Finalization; UNSW= University of New South Wales
Figure 1 Process, timelines and actors.
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This section examines the lead-up to the MTP change. It
examines the rationale for, and initiation of, the change,
and considers the role of the NCPF in particular.
How and where the change began As already indicated,
the idea for changing the MTP came from the MWG, tak-
ing account of the high malaria burden in the country in
which the annual clinical malaria incidence showed an
unstable rate of 236.1 per 1,000 population in 2004 and
212.4 per 1,000 population in 2007 [21]. Apart from this, a
desire to improve diagnosis was also part of the rationale.
In 2007 it was reported that the correct diagnosis of mal-
aria through the use of microscopy was as low as 28 to
40% across the country, with laboratory diagnosis occur-
ring primarily in the few hospitals and Community Health
Centers (CHCs) located in district capitals.This meant that
the majority of the population who sought treatment in
health facilities in remote areas such as Health Posts
and Mobile Clinics, and even some CHCs, did not have
access to proper diagnosis. In addition, the reagents needed
for microscopic examination of malaria parasite were
not readily available adding further difficulties [27]. This
resulted in encouraging the MoH and the WHO to go
ahead with the idea of changing the treatment protocol
and to begin the process of altering the policy on mal-
aria treatment in the country.
Timor-Leste Assistência Integrado Saúde (TAIS), a
USAID funded Agency, to the Minister of Health to ask apossibility of conducting an efficacy study on SP, but it was
felt not feasible at that time due to the lack of a function-
ing human research ethics committee:
“…the option discussed at that time was [to conduct a]
therapeutic efficacy study to find out the efficacy of SP,
but the conditions at that time seemed to be difficult
to undertake this study due to various reasons like
there was no ethics committee and others. At that time
[the] Minister gave a solution [that] if there was already
evidence available then we [should] just change it
directly from SP to ACT” (Malaria Officer, MoH).
The MoH believed that it was not necessary to repli-
cate studies that had been conducted in other countries
which were likely to produce similar results and thus
represented an unnecessary waste of time and resources.
“One of my concerns was the proliferation of studies
without any significant need. What I mean by any
significant need is if there is evidence out there about
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of X, Y or Z medicine,
why should we do it in our country again, why should
we lose time going through studies” (Minister for
Health 2001–2007).
The decision was made to change to ACT based on
international experience and advice, with efforts geared
toward collecting the published evidence which would
Table 1 Summary of actors’ roles and their contributions to the MTP development
Actors/Organisations Main responsibility Contribution to MTP development
Ministry of Health Develop malaria policies, coordinate and
implement the malaria control program
Draft the protocol, lead process and finalisation of the protocol.
World Health Organization
country office in Timor-Leste
Provide technical assistance needed by the
MoH including policy development
Draft the protocol, search for evidence from the literature and seek
advice from malaria experts in other countries. Assist the MoH in
protocol formulation, completion and official approval.
Non-government organizations
(HNI, CARE International, CRS, HAI)
Implement malaria control program
particularly in health promotion and
prevention activities
Some clinicians working with the NGOs provide technical expertise
in relation to drug dosages and the application of the protocol in
the IMCI program.
Bilateral – USAID through its
agency TAIS
Implementing Child Survival Programs –
mainly involved in ITN distribution
Contribute inputs to the finalisation of the draft protocol.
USAID offered to conduct SP efficacy study, but this was not taken
forward.
Cuban Medical Brigade Provide curative service but also health
promotion and prevention activities.
Contribute to the finalisation of the draft protocol and Spanish
translation.
Medical Association Provide curative service, health promotion
and prevention activities.
Contribute to the finalisation of the draft protocol, translation and
socialisation.
Private Clinics Curative service One private clinic had used Artemisinin-based combination therapy
prior to the official adoption by the MoH.
National Commission for Protocol
Finalisation
The NCPF members drawn from the
various organisations
Finalise the draft protocol, approve the MTP text, translate the MTP
into Tetum and Spanish, and conduct socialisation.
The Global Fund to fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria
Provide funding for the Malaria Control
Program
The Global Fund created the MWG. The MWG was instrumental to
the proposed idea of changing MTP for P. falciparum from SP to AL.
Assist with the literature review to find evidence for changing the
protocol and assist with drafting the protocol.
External expert WHO SEARO had expertise in guideline
development and RBM strategies
Provide advice on the protocol and development of the treatment





AL: Artemether-Lumefantrine; CRS: Catholic Relief Services; HAI: Health Alliance International; HNI: HealthNet International; MTP: Malaria Treatment Protocol; MWG:
Malaria Working Group; NCPF: National Commission for Protocol Finalisation; RBM: Roll Back Malaria; SP: Sulphadoxine-Pyrimethamine; TAIS: Timor-Leste
Assistência Integrado Saúde; USAID: United States Agency for International Development; WHO SEARO: World Health Organization South East Asia Regional Office.
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of the MTP initiated by the CDC-MoH, the WHO and
the MWG. Expert opinions from the WHO regional office
and Mahidol University in Thailand were also sought.
“We drafted it together…major [part of the] protocol
development was in consultation not only with the
WHO, it was consulted with some scientists,
particularly from Thailand” (WHO country
representative 2000–2007).
The draft was then presented back to the Minister and
was approved. Plans for introducing the protocol to health
workers and the training for implementation were then
developed.
Actors involved in the formulation team expressed their
views about the policy process as reflected here. According
to them, this was the first time in Timor-Leste that the
formulation of a treatment protocol was collectively under-
taken with the involvement of a wide range of actors. It
was suggested that other protocols should undergo a simi-
lar process.“It’s good because it’s not only one person’s work, it is
team work. We compare it with other guidelines and
protocol [developed], this is the first time getting Timorese
doctors involved” (WHO staff and NCPF member).
Most of them agreed with the change, warning that
the cost to human life and to the economy would other-
wise be substantial.
“I think it was right time to change…not changing it
might have [led to] more cases of malaria, more
deaths, work force and economic loss for the country”
(Paediatrician, NGO senior staff and NCPF member).
Aside from the positive views about the MTP policy
process, there were also concerns expressed that the MTP
process was a top down process and the involvement of
a technical committee was seen as an effort to legitimise
the process.
“[It was] a top down approach, a technical committee
was used more as the process of validation than
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expertise of committee members might have created
this scenario” (NGO worker and NCPF member).
The private sector appreciated the opportunity to par-
ticipate but lamented that they had not been fully engaged
in the policy process.
“It seems it is very difficult for the government to
involve the private sector, even if they do, when the
process is nearly complete, so this is not an
involvement, but an introduction” (Senior medical
practitioner in Dili).
Despite these concerns, it was agreed that it was best
for the country to change the MTP.
Rationale for changing the protocol according to the
key informants involved in the protocol formulation
The most important reasons stated for the change are
reflected in the quotes below and included perceived SP
resistance, limited access to proper diagnosis, and the
rising incidence of malaria (Table 2).
“First of all, this was based on the existing high speed
of rising drug resistance to SP which was documented
in Indonesia…second is WHO’s common understanding
of the unique opportunity to introduce drugs which
Timorese really required…that was the reason behind
this” (WHO country representative 2000–2007).
The issue of perceived resistance to SP was reinforced
by clinical experience:
“I can tell you as a clinician, seeing patients all the
time, maybe as much as four years ago I started to see
when we gave Fansidar [SP] certain patients are not
getting better and [in years] before almost everyone
was getting better, so I started to lose faith in Fansidar
a long time ago” (Senior medical practitioner in Dili).Table 2 Reasons for changing the treatment protocol accordi
Participants Reasons stated
n = 24 Perceived SP resistance
No access to proper diagnosis and treatm
Rising malaria incidence
Health Minister’s request to change
Fulfilling political commitment at regional
Losing faith in SP
The desire to standardise malaria treatme
ACT not yet resistant and price drop
Note: more than one reason mentioned by informants.Policy makers saw that the change of the MTP in
Timor-Leste was complemented by efforts to improve
diagnostic practices from a symptomatic approach to a
more reliable diagnosis as well as improving treatment
practices.
“I think the main concern at the time was that
malaria treatment was not widely accessible by the
community in terms of appropriate diagnosis and
appropriate treatment. One of the issues was
appropriate diagnosis; it was found that microscope
examination [to detect the malaria parasites in the
blood] was not provided widely throughout the
country.” (Minister for Health 2001–2007).
The intention to provide effective treatment was also
related to ethical issues; the belief that it would have
been unethical to continue treating patients with ineffica-
cious drugs. In addition, treating patients with efficacious
drugs is more economical as it prevents complications
which could lead to further costs.
The NCPF and its role As explained earlier, the NCPF’s
role was to review and agree on the final draft of the
MTP before official approval was granted. In reviewing
and examining the content of this draft protocol, the
NCPF went through a meticulous process to finalise the
draft.
“First we looked at the general things, and then we
gave them the draft and asked them to make
comments. They could give their comments through
email…our task was to receive the inputs, when the
inputs came, we analysed them together. After this, we
conducted meetings twice per week, again we also
looked through them page by page, we looked at the
dosages” (WHO staff and NCPF member).
The work of the NCPF culminated with the adoption of
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the contribution of the NCPF. Although the draft protocol
had been prepared, the NCPF improved the content of the
existing draft.
“Because this draft was already there, [NCPF]
contributions in terms of technical matters…they
enriched the draft” (Head of CDC and co-chairman of
the NCPF).Challenges during the formulation of the new protocol
Challenges during the development of the revised MTP
included difficulties in managing people in the working
group, resistance from some health workers, divergence
of implementation strategy, language difficulties, and un-
certainty about the government’s capacity to implement
the change.
The formulation process of the protocol involved many
actors and some NCPF members experienced difficulties in
managing people with diverse experiences and backgrounds.
“It took a bit longer because to make this protocol, the
discussion was a little bit complicated…there were
many ideas that emerged at the time of developing
this protocol, some people had experience (working) in
Africa, they would say their experience” (MoH Malaria
Officer).
Communication was also complex in terms of the diffi-
culty in reaching the NCPF members by telephone. The
language used to draft the protocol was English and the
reading materials were also in English.
The lack of data on the resistance status of SP to
P. falciparum available within Timor-Leste left some
NCPF members still believing that SP was effective.
“My observation [is that] SP is still sensitive [to
P. falciparum], though there were one or two cases
of resistance, we gave second line treatment. We
observed this based on clinical basis” (A doctor and
NCPF member).
Some NCPF members from NGOs and private sector
pushed for the inclusion of community health volunteers
in providing diagnosis and treatment with an argument
that people in remote areas would continue to have no
access to early treatment if the RDT examination and
AL could only be delivered by health workers.
However, the MoH maintained its position to only
allow trained health workers to conduct diagnosis and
treatments. Others raised concerns over the weak drug
supply system and the readiness of the health sector to
embrace and ultimately implement the change.Discussion
The increase of malaria cases, the need to improve diagno-
sis and treatment, and the perceived rise in SP resistance
prompted Timor-Leste to change its treatment protocol
for malaria.
As Walt and Gilson (1994) have argued, many policies
in developing countries have failed to reach their final
objective because the policy process paid more attention
to content while giving little or no attention to context,
process and actors [10]. The formulation of this treat-
ment protocol demonstrates that while the content, that
is changing of a drug regimen, was required, the process
needed to devote attention to the actors involved and
the context in which policy change and implementation
was to occur.
Three important factors drove the process of changing
the MTP. Firstly, there was a demand from people work-
ing on the ground to have the protocol changed; these
included the MWG and a number of other clinicians.
Secondly, the role of the technical departments, in this
case, the CDC Department within the MoH and WHO,
which reinforced the idea of changing the MTP from the
first group and proactively approached the Minister to
suggest the change. This second group also actively sought
evidence on drug (SP) resistance from neighbouring coun-
tries [15,16,22,28] to justify their argument. The active
policy process pursued by the second group was further
strengthened with the appointment of the NCPF which
expanded the participation of stakeholders with a mandate
to approve the final draft of the protocol before offi-
cial approval from the Minister for Health. Thirdly, the
Minister’s role was key. His leadership enabled change
in the MTP without a local efficacy study being conducted.
The Minister’s decision drove forward the policy process.
Most informants indicated that even if the decision
had been made to conduct a study, in the end, the result
would have been to recommend changing the then SP
regimen to a more potent anti-malarial drug, ACT, as
the preferable option. Many would have liked local data
to support the change, but the scarcity of resources
available in the country made this option not feasible.
The decision made by the Minister has been viewed as
“undermining” the importance of locally generated evi-
dence on drug resistance. However, it can also be argued
that the Minister for Health had sufficient confidence
and leadership to argue there was “good enough” (albeit
incomplete) evidence to avoid delays and make the re-
quired changes. Zambia went through a similar situation
when it changed its treatment to AL; there too the direct
intervention of the Minister sped up the policy process
of developing a treatment protocol for malaria [29]. This
policy process fits with the Kingdon model of three
streams: problems, politics and policy. The three streams
may each invite policy change, but this might have taken
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than one stream is present, policy change tends to speed
up [30]. In the context of Timor-Leste malaria policy, we
can equate the rising cases of malaria and MWG and cli-
nicians who advocated for a change of treatment as prob-
lem streams. The CDC Department and WHO saw the
case (problem) presented by the MWG to change the
treatment guidelines and argued for a change in policy
(policy stream), while the Minister’s decision reinforced
the politics stream – including a view that if the end result
was to be the same then why not initiate the change as
soon as possible.
Evidence from the South-East Asia region, particularly
Indonesia [22], Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia
[16,31-33] supported the change. Timor-Leste was not
alone in changing treatment in the absence of local evi-
dence, several other countries like Peru, Kenya, Tanzania
and Zambia, also changed their treatment protocols largely
on the basis of international evidence [29,34]. The Minis-
terial Meeting in Bangladesh in 2006, which approved
ACT as the standard for treating falciparum malaria for all
SEARO countries, was also influential [23]. A Timor-based
study by Almeida et al. published after the approval of
the MTP subsequently confirmed high rates of resistance
of SP to P. falcifarum (82.3%) [35], underpinning the
Minister’s belief at the time in the case for policy change.
It was well recognised that the local actors did not
have much and/or any experience in policy development
and this was certainly a challenge. However, the limited
experience of local actors in policy development was
offset by drawing on other locally available or sourced
expertise from the WHO and participants in the MWG
and NCPF.
The protocol was developed in 2006–2007 which coin-
cided with a period of conflict and instability, particularly
in Dili [25,26]. Key meetings, discussions and workshops
are, and in this case were, held in Dili, the capital city.
Conflicts have the potential to reduce the capacity in
policy making, planning and implementation [36,37],
but apart from delaying some meetings, this did not in-
hibit the work of the actors involved in the development
of the MTP. Indeed, the conflict in 2006 strengthened
the resolve, and in some senses, the capacity of the MoH
to deliver health services to the population. A commit-
ment of the MoH leadership, plus the availability of extra
resources to address emergent needs, helped ensure that
most health needs of the displaced population and general
population were met [25,26]. This demonstrated the
importance of leadership in maintaining the functions
of institutions. For example, the MoH was the lead
health institution during the political instability and seized
opportunities to introduce necessary changes for longer
term benefit. The new MTP was a concrete example of
seizing opportunities in a political instability or crisis topromote change. Therefore, it confirms that whilst polit-
ical crisis may bring violence and destruction of people’s
lives, there may also be “windows of opportunity” to intro-
duce longer term and positive change [37].
The study highlights the importance of interactions
between actors, content and context in policy develop-
ment processes, and also reinforces the importance of
leadership, presented here as the ability to make key de-
cisions based on country needs and available informa-
tion and evidence, intelligently analysed.
Timor-Leste offers valuable lessons to other countries
facing similar challenges. In resource-poor countries,
developing good policies or changing unworkable (out-
dated) policies can occur when governments can skilfully
mobilise expertise from the non-government sector and
work collaboratively with them to drive the desired changes.
The formulation of the new MTP in Timor-Leste is one
such example. Equally important was bringing together
actors from different organisations into the protocol
development process: this served as a venue where ac-
tors with little or no experience could develop skills in
interacting with processes concerned with developing
treatment guidelines and protocols. These reflect also
the importance of supporting the development of pro-
fessional and institutional capacity.
Conclusion
The development of the revised MTP coincided with a dif-
ficult period of instability in Timor-Leste. The rationale
behind the change was driven by the increase of malaria
cases, the need to improve diagnosis and treatment, and
the perception of increasing drug resistance. The absence
of local evidence did not inhibit the process given the
leadership by the Minister for Health and his staff who
argued there was enough evidence, in a variety of forms,
from the country and region to promote the policy change.
The case and evidence-base for policy change was good
enough and did not need to await final scientific “proof”.
The policy change was developed in a cooperative nature
involving interactions between a range of local, national
and expatriate individuals and agencies, within and outside
of government. While this may have slowed aspects of the
process, it bore fruit during policy implementation given
the sense of ownership by many of those involved. Some
weaknesses remained and have been described elsewhere
[7]. This study also demonstrates that while political crises
bring violence, destruction and disruption of people’s
lives and livelihoods, quality leadership and develop-
ment partner support can, even in these situations, open
and see through “windows of opportunity” to introduce
longer term policy and systems change.
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